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The Economic Roots of the Cold War: The IMF,
ITO and Other Economic Issues in Post-War
Soviet-American Relations
Kristina V. Minkova

Abstract
In light of newly released archival resources, this article examines the traditional
historiography of Soviet-American relations focusing on economic relations at the
end of World War II.

The Cold War had an immense impact on the historical development of the world
in the second half of the twentieth century, and its consequences continue to
influence international relations. Examining the origins of the Cold War, the role of
the U.S.S.R., and the United States in waging it remains highly relevant and topical
today.
This study reveals the intensions of the Soviet government to participate in
international economic cooperation at the end of World War II, undermining the
distorted Cold War view of the 1950s-1980s propagated by both Soviet and Western
propaganda. This new understanding is partly explained by the fact that the bulk of
the documents had been for a long time unavailable to researchers. 1 Meanwhile, it
shows that the history of Soviet-American relations and particularly that of the
period considered is not indisputable. Nor should such studies be limited to the
political problems that have traditionally been the focus of such scholarship. These
enduring stereotypes significantly impede an impartial assessment of the current
state of Russian-American relations. The paper further demonstrates how
diplomatic missteps, fears, and hesitations contributed to the beginning of a long
disastrous period in international relations known as the Cold War.
Economic relations between the U.S.S.R. and the United States in 1944–1946
cover a significant range of issues: the settlement of deliveries under the LendLease Agreement; the question of the American loan to the U.S.S.R.; and the
1

A significant bulk of the documents was declassified in 1992 but they are not freely
available. They are preserved in the Archive of the Foreign Policy of the Russian
Federation which can be accessed only with a special license. Unfortunately, the researcher
will not necessarily receive the documents he or she needs but only the documents that the
keepers find appropriate to serve out. Many documents are still under seal.
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American initiative to create several international economic and financial
institutions including the International Monetary Fund, the International Bank, and
the International Trade Organization, and the Soviet participation in these
organizations.
It should be noted that neither the Soviet nor the American leadership had a
unified position on any of these issues. Within three years, 1944–1946, Washington
had changed its attitude to the very consideration of the issues listed above: one day
they were planned to be discussed all together, another day, strictly separately. From
the beginning of the talks the Soviet Government declared its desire to discuss each
issue separately, but in the process it agreed to unite some of them into blocks.

Background
During the Second World War the future of international economic cooperation was
addressed in the Atlantic Charter and the Lend-Lease Master Agreement, but it was
more precisely taken up only at the Moscow Conference of the Allied powers in
late 1943. This conference was preceded by exchange of memoranda from both
American and Soviet sides regarding the necessity to start bilateral confidential
negotiations on major problems of post-war economic development (AVPRF 624,
1–2). On November 1, 1943, the Soviet, U.S., and British foreign ministers signed
a secret protocol containing 10 annexes. The ninth annex was entitled “The bases
of our program for international economic cooperation” (FRUS, 1943, pp. 763–
766). This program contained a list of issues that the “Big Three” considered the
most important not only for the normalization of international economic
cooperation, but also for the success of the post-war system of international
relations as a whole. The list was topped by the expansion of international trade on
a non-discriminatory basis and the regulation of tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade
in goods, as well as the establishment of solid international currency exchange rates
and the organization of currency exchange.
The Americans and a lesser extent, the British, took the laboring oar in
developing draft proposals on these issues. In the Soviet Union the People’s
Commissariats of Finance (Narkomfin) and Foreign Trade (NKVT), in co-operation
with the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs (NKID) also worked on the
Soviet position regarding post-war international economic relations.
The American proposals regarding the development of international trade led
to the drafting of the Charter of the International Trade Organization (ITO). It was
signed by 53 countries at the UN Conference on Trade and Employment on March
24, 1948, but never ratified by the United States and, therefore, most of the other
signatory countries (Minkova, 2006, pp. 118-120). As for the establishment of fixed
exchange rates and the organization of free currency exchange, the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) and the International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development (IBRD) were founded in the aftermath of the United Nations
Monetary and Financial Conference held in Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, in
July 1944.
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The Settlement of Deliveries under the Lend-Lease Agreement
On May 12, 1945, the Acting Secretary of State Joseph Grew sent Soviet chargé
d’affaires in Washington Nikolay Novikov a note informing the Soviet government
that "the shipment of supplies under the current program of Lend-Lease will be
immediately modified in view of the end of organized hostilities in Europe" (FRUS,
1945, pp. 1000–1001). The Soviet side was completely unprepared for this message
(the answering note stated that “The note referred to and the discontinuance of
deliveries have come as a complete surprise to the Soviet Government” (AVPRF
702, 1), and reacted very negatively. This perception of the situation settled deeply
both in Soviet/Russian and American historiography becoming the basis of many
false assumptions. To begin with, this note was considered authentic evidence of
the abrupt change of U.S. policy towards the Soviet Union after the death of
Franklin D. Roosevelt (Fleming, 1961, p. 269; Herring, 1973, p. 181; Pechatnov,
2006, p. 328). As a matter of fact the situation was completely different. Firstly, the
United States was considering a program of post-war assistance to the Soviet Union
since 1943 (FRUS, 1945, p. 937). Secondly, Washington was determined to fully
implement its commitments on deliveries in the framework of the Fourth Protocol
to the Lend-Lease Agreement and negotiate the Fifth Protocol, as State Department
repeatedly notified the Soviet embassy in various documents (AVPRF 624, 13–14;
FRUS, 1944, pp. 1032, 1084). Third, the termination of supplies under the LendLease Agreement stemmed from the wording of the U.S. Lend-Lease Act,
according to which the deliveries under this program were to be ceased with the end
of hostilities.
Further delays in the talks on this issue ended with the signing of the
“Agreement between the Governments of the US and the U.S.S.R. on the
disposition of lend-lease supplies in inventory or procurement in the United States”
(United States Treaties and Other International Agreements, p. 2819–2822) on
October 15, 1945. The delays were mostly caused by the actions of the Soviet
leadership which greatly delayed answering notes and other messages in the
framework of negotiations. In addition, the U.S. side interpreted the Soviet violation
of the Article III of Mutual Aid Agreement from June 11, 1942, as an inappropriate
and egregious breach of trust. This article prohibited the Soviet government “to
transfer title to, or possession of, any defense article or defense information,
transferred to it under the Act of March 11, 1941, of the Congress of the United
States of America, or permit the use thereof by any one not an officer, employee, or
agent of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics” (Mutual Aid
Agreement). Meanwhile, the U.S. Ambassador in Moscow Averell Harriman
reported to the State Department in March 1945 that Stalin had presented Poland
with 500 trucks received by lend-lease. Another 1,000 trucks were "donated" by the
Red Army to Łódź. In addition, Harriman mentioned deliveries of lend-lease flour
to Poland and sugar to Finland (FRUS, 1945, p. 990).
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The Negotiations over the U.S. Loan to the U.S.S.R.
The idea of granting the Soviet Union a credit worth several billion U.S. dollars for
post-war reconstruction emerged in the U.S. Treasury even before an official
request from the Soviet side. Throughout 1944, Trade Secretary Henry Morgenthau,
Jr. repeatedly discussed with various U.S. officials the possibility of giving such a
loan to the Soviet Union (FRUS, 1945, pp. 938-939).
The official request from the Soviet leadership was set out in the memorandum
handed to Harriman by the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs Vyatcheslav
Molotov on January 3, 1945. The Soviet Government asked for a $6 billion credit
for a period of 30 years at a 2.5% interest rate to purchase American industrial
products and equipment required for the speedy restoration of their war-ravaged
economy (AVPRF 29, p. 1). The reaction to this request came immediately: on
January 6, 1945, Harriman wrote to then Secretary of State Edward Stettinius: "It is
my basic conviction that we should do everything we can to assist the Soviet Union
through credits in developing a sound economy. I feel strongly that the sooner the
Soviet Union can develop a decent life for its people the more tolerant they will
become" (FRUS, 1945, p. 947). At the same time Harriman insisted that
negotiations on credit came completely separate from the negotiations on the lendlease settlement.
On January 10, 1945, Secretary of Trade Morgenthau sent a memorandum to
Roosevelt proposing to grant the Soviet Union a $10 billion credit for 35 years at
2% interest rate (FRUS, 1945, p. 948). Appropriate attention should be given to the
uniqueness of this situation: the U.S. government, in fact, showed willingness to
provide the U.S.S.R. with a larger credit on more favorable terms and for a longer
period than requested!
However, it is here where the first difficulties emerged. The Soviet side insisted
on discussing the loan jointly with the settlement of the Lend-Lease Act,
considering it virtually one question. In the United States the State Department
began debating on the form of the credit, conditions of its granting and, most
importantly, on how to make Congress adopt relevant legislation to realize the
procedure. Unable to find a quick compromise with the Soviet leadership the United
States suspended deliveries under the Fourth Protocol to the Lend-Lease
Agreement. Both sides found themselves frustrated.
If the Soviet Union were to enter the war with Japan it would be in the need of
supplies under the Fourth Protocol; but until then the State Department could not
justify the need of their renewal to the Congress. U.S. Assistant Secretary of State
Joseph C. Grew communicated this problem to Soviet charge d'affaires in the
United States Nikolay Novikov in a note dated June 26, 1945 (FRUS, 1945, pp.
1027-1028). However, the next day Grew sent Novikov another note informing the
latter about the possibility of delivering to the U.S.S.R. those goods from the list
submitted by the Soviet side which could be found and prepared to ship by August
31, 1945. In a note dated July 17, 1945, this period was extended for one month
(FRUS, 1945, pp. 1029-1030).
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By this time the balance of power between the Allied Powers shifted
significantly. The successful nuclear test of July 1945 made the United States and
its President Harry Truman feel that they now occupied a unique position in postwar international relations. Being sure that the Soviet physicists would need another
15-20 years to develop their own nuclear bomb, President Truman began acting
abruptly. In his famous letter to the U.S. Secretary of State James Byrnes, he
confessed that he was “tired of babying the Soviets” (Truman, 1955, pp. 551–552).
Hence in any negotiations the American side stopped seeking compromise. The
question of credit was firmly tied to other problems in the economic relations
between the two countries. In a memo of General Wesson, Director of the U.S.S.R.
Branch of Foreign Economic Administration to its Administrator L. Crowley the
former stressed the need to conclude a U.S.-Soviet trade agreement, an agreement
on fishing rights in the Bering Sea and around the Aleutian Islands, and to settle
violations of the Article III of the Lend-Lease Agreement mentioned above.
Repeated U.S. notes to the Soviet leadership were left unanswered and Moscow did
not terminate supplies of the lend-lease goods and equipment to third countries
(FRUS, 1945, pp. 1038-1039). Meanwhile, the protracted negotiations between
different U.S. administrations left Soviet requests for American credit unanswered.
Stalin commented on this situation at a meeting with Senator Pepper and other
American Congressmen in Moscow in September (Kennan, 1967, p. 179). Given
the urgency of Soviet requests, it is further notable that it was not until August 9,
1945, that Harriman informed the Soviet leadership on the introduction of the U.S.
law authorizing the Export-Import Bank to provide loans to other countries
(AVPRF 669, p. 67).
The signing of the already mentioned Agreement on lend-lease supplies on
October 15, 1945, was the last success in the Soviet-American talks on economic
issues. After that the negotiations stalled despite the persistent interest from both
the Soviet and American sides. On December 21, Harriman sent James Byrnes a
telegram stating that “Little information has been received by this Embassy
regarding our over-all economic policy towards the Soviet Union and particularly
as it relates to Soviet economic policies .... Since Soviet political policy appears to
be influenced by economic objectives it would seem that we should give at this time
greater attention to the concerting of our economic policy with our political policy
towards the Soviet Union” (FRUS, 1945, p. 1049).

The U.S.S.R. & the Creation of the International Trade Organization
Harriman’s telegram to Washington was well received. The same day, December
21, Harriman forwarded to Molotov’s deputy A. Vyshinsky “Proposals for the
expansion of world trade and employment.” Similar texts were sent to 13 other
countries two weeks prior (AVPRF 47, pp. 137–139). Being the result of an
exhaustive bargaining between Washington and London, the “Proposals” were a
clear expression of the American view of the post-war economic order. The Soviet
Government was asked whether it would agree to participate in the negotiations
scheduled for March or April 1946. This document caused a major stir in the NKID
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and NKVT that had already developed their own views on post-war organization of
international trade. By December 31, 1945, the “Proposals” have been carefully
studied in several departments of the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs.
That day Molotov received a memo “On the US proposals to expand world trade
and employment” (AVPRF, 700), signed by one of his deputies, Amazasp
Arutyunyan, and the head of the NKID economic department Vladimir
Gerashchenko. The letter briefly considered the American proposals for the
preparation of an international conference on trade and employment, which was
supposed to convene in the summer of 1946 under the aegis of the UN. In addition,
the letter contained a summary of the basic principles of the Charter of the World
Organization Trade and Employment. Arutyunyan and Gerashchenko wrote, “The
American proposals to expand trade and employment – in particular as regards our
foreign trade are largely unacceptable for us” (AVPRF 700, p. 3). However, they
would find it possible to agree to participate in the preliminary discussions in March
and April 1946 on the issues of world trade and employment, “not being bound,
however, by any obligations with respect to our participation in the World
Conference on trade and employment”( AVPRF 700, p. 3). They concluded that
Soviet participation in the “said preliminary discussion of the US proposals on
world trade” was advisable “regardless of whether we participate or not in the
projected global organization” (AVPRF 700, p. 4).
These officials substantiated the need for the Soviet Union's participation in the
talks by the fact that even in the case of a decision not to participate in the activities
of the ITO, it would have been advisable to try removing from its charter provisions
any aspects disadvantageous for the U.S.S.R., in order to test American, British,
and other participants’ intentions in the negotiations as well as to examine the
current state of trade and economic contradictions etc. If, however, Soviet
participation in the Organization would be recognized in the future as desirable,
participation in the preliminary discussions of the proposals for the conference,
which would resolve the issue of the creation of the International Organization on
Trade and Employment, would be all the more important (AVPRF 700). On January
3, 1946, Molotov forwarded this letter and the “Proposals” to his other deputy,
Vladimir Dekanozov with the following note: “Please, present the project agreed
with Comrade Mikoyan” (AVPRF 700, p. 1). All internal correspondence was
classified as “secret”.
During January and February 1946 both NKID and NKVT were actively
studying American proposals and their potential impact on the Soviet economy,
Soviet-American relations and the U.S.S.R.'s position in the post-war world.
However, at that time Moscow did not produce any response to the “Proposals.”
The consequences were disastrous. On February 21, 1946, Byrnes sent to Soviet
charge d'affaires in Washington Fyodor Orekhov a note stating that from that day,
all economic questions between the two countries would only be negotiated
together. By that time this list of questions included:
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(1) Claims of American nationals against the government of the U.S.S.R.,
including claims arising from actions of the U.S.S.R. in occupied and
liberated areas;
(2) Determining the concerted policy to be followed by the United States,
U.S.S.R., and the United Kingdom in assisting the peoples liberated
from the domination of Nazi Germany, and the peoples of the former
Axis satellite states of Europe to solve their pressing economic
problems by democratic means;
(3) Arrangements of free, equal, and open navigation on rivers of
international concern to individuals, commercial vessels, and goods
of all members of the United Nations;
(4) Preliminary discussions of a comprehensive treaty of friendship,
commerce, and navigation between the United States and the
U.S.S.R., and agreement to enter into negotiations in the near future
for the conclusion of such a treaty;
(5) Arrangements to assure the adequate protection of the interests of the
writers and inventors and other copyright holders;
(6) Methods for giving effect to the United States “Proposals for
Expansion of World Trade and Employment” transmitted to the
Soviet leadership on December 21, 1945 (the date of transmission was
surely put intentionally to show Soviet unwillingness to co-operation
in this project of ultimate international importance);
(7) General settlement of lend-lease obligations in accordance with the
provisions of the Lend-Lease Agreement on the basis of an inventory
of lend-lease supplies in the possession of the U.S.S.R. or subject to
its control at the end of hostilities;
(8) Civil aviation matters of mutual interest to the two countries;
(9) Discussion of other economic questions (FRUS, 1946, pp. 828-829).
It took the Soviet side almost a month to work out a suitable reply to that note.
In his memoirs the then People's Commissar for Foreign Trade Anastas Mikoyan
sparingly explained the reasons of such delay: “It was to our disadvantage, because
for credits they wanted us to make concessions on other issues, that we were not
ready to make decisions on” (Mikoyan, 1999, p. 495). Thus, only on March 15,
1946, Novikov informed Byrnes that the Soviet government agreed to discuss with
the following questions: the amount and terms of credit; the conclusion of a treaty
of friendship, commerce, and navigation; methods for giving effect to the provisions
of Article VII of the Lend-Lease Agreement; and the question of lend-lease
supplies. As for other issues, the Soviet Government did not consider it “expedient
to connect the discussion of any other questions with the discussion on credit” but
expressed its willingness to discuss them at a time and place to be agreed upon by
both parties (FRUS, 1946, pp. 829-830).
This time it was the U.S. leadership that took over a month to reply. On April
18, 1946, in a note to Novikov, Byrnes welcomed the readiness of the Soviet side
to discuss the issues listed in the note from March 15. However, Washington
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considered three matters not included in the Soviet list–that is the claims of
American nationals against the government of the U.S.S.R; the concerted policies
for economic assistance for liberated nations and the protection of intellectual
property–closely connected with the issues that the Soviet Union government has
already agreed to discuss immediately. He therefore suggested starting negotiations
on these issues on May 15 in Washington, and on the technical aspects of lend-lease
supplies–10 days before. Later on Byrnes expressed his pleasure from noticing the
presence of a Soviet observer in the first meetings of the Boards of Governors of
the IMF and IBRD, and expressed the hope that the Soviet Union would soon
become a member of these organizations and participate in their activity (FRUS,
1946, pp. 834–837).
The Soviet experts from NKVT took about a month to finalize the answering
note. On May 17, Novikov communicated to the Acting Secretary of State Dean
Acheson a note repeating almost word for word the text of the Soviet note of March
15. The only exception was the date–the Soviet side agreed to begin negotiations in
May that year (already late for a few days to the date proposed earlier by the
Americans)–and the addition of the question of navigation on the rivers and civil
aviation to the discussion agenda. As for other issues of American concern, the
Soviet leadership repeated its position that they had not been directly connected to
key issues it agreed to discuss, but again expressed its willingness to start a
preliminary exchange of views on an agreed date (FRUS, 1946, pp. 841–842).
On May 23, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs W. Clayton
received from the Office of Financial and Development Policy a memorandum
containing new measures for the response to the Soviets. It proposed two scenarios
for further actions:
1. To make use of the phrasing in the Soviet notes, and to suspend the
negotiations on credit; and
2. To defer discussions of a larger loan in the Congress until there is a
guarantee of the successful completion of negotiations with the
U.S.S.R. while providing the Soviet Union with a minor credit of $
250-500 mln from free sums of Export-Import Bank (FRUS, 1946, pp.
842–843).
The United States’ response followed in another month arriving only on June
13. Byrnes still insisted on the simultaneous discussion of all economic issues and
appointed a new date for the commencement of negotiations–July 10, 1946 (FRUS,
1946, pp. 844–845). At the very bottom of the note it was stated that the U.S.
government would be grateful for a quick response–a very clear allusion to the fact
that there had been no progress in negotiations for six months. Meanwhile,
representatives of 19 countries had already been actively working out the draft
Charter of the ITO, the discussion of which was due to begin on October 15 in
Geneva (Minkova, 2006, p. 111).
At the end of June 1946, the U.S. State Department prepared a draft of a new
lend-lease agreement that the United States had hoped to discuss with the Soviet
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Union and sign in a short time. However, no reaction to the note from June 13
followed from the Soviet side until early September. By then the State Department
had to admit the need to offer Moscow separate talks on the Lend-Lease Agreement
to get it off the ground and achieve at least some kind of positive result. William
Clayton sent the corresponding note to Fyodor Orekhov on September 14, 1946. In
addition, U.S. officials regarded these negotiations as a means to win back three
American icebreakers transferred to the Soviet Union by lend-lease. Instead of
being returned to the United States after the end of hostilities, these vessels were
illegally held by the Soviets in violation of all agreements.
Clayton’s note remained unanswered. On December 31, 1946, the U.S.
ambassador to the U.S.S.R. W. B. Smith had to “remind” Molotov about it (FRUS,
1946, p. 865).
It should be stressed that in reality the Soviet attitude to the American proposals
was by no means so indifferent as it may seem from the correspondence discussed
above. It is true that in accordance with Anastas Mikoyan recollections the LendLease Agreement did not represent any interest to the Soviet Union, and the Soviet
leadership did everything possible to hold up talks on this issue (Mikoyan, 1999, p.
495). However, Moscow regarded an invitation to participate in the negotiations on
the ITO as extremely important. The American “Proposals” had been carefully
studied in the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade, and approximately
since the end of May 1946 the Ministry of Foreign Trade started developing detailed
guidelines (“directives”) for the Soviet delegation to participate in working out the
draft Charter of the ITO. Beside a very detailed analysis with a separate conclusion
on every paragraph of the “Proposals for the expansion of world trade and
employment,” and a draft of the ITO Charter in its version from December 1945,
these guidelines contained positions on all the economic issues listed in the note
from February 21. These directives had even been approved by a special resolution
carried by the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolshevik)
(RGASPI 28, 68–173). Another proof of the great desire of the Soviet leadership to
take an active role in multilateral talks could be found in the renaming of the
Council of the People's Commissars to the Council of Ministers and the People's
Commissariats to the Ministries in March 1946 in order to conform to international
standards (Law on Transformation, 1946). Some groups within the American
leadership and academia had also been confident about the potential participation
of the Soviet Union in the post-war economic cooperation, especially in the
activities of the IMF and the ITO talks. This attitude survived Churchill’s famous
Fulton speech and lived up to mid-1947. In May 1947, the respected journal The
American Economic Review published an article authored by a famous American
historian and economist Alexander Gerschenkron (1947) entitled “Russia and the
International Trade Organization.” This article analyzed in considerable detail the
applicability of each article of the draft ITO Charter to the economic and political
situation in the U.S.S.R. In conclusion, Gerschenkron (1947) expressed confidence
that Soviet participation in the ITO would contribute to “laying the basis of peaceful
economic collaboration between different economic worlds” (p. 642).
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The Participation of the U.S.S.R. in the IMF and World Bank
In early 1944, active talks were held between the Soviet and American experts
regarding the basic principles of the IMF. Although almost every amendment
proposed by the Soviet side had been declined by the Americans, in the middle of
March 1944, the latter made counter-proposals for virtually all the points in
question: the ruble exchange rate; the discount in contribution in gold for the
countries severely damaged by war; the amount of basic economic information to
be presented to the Fund; and the executive force of the Fund’s decisions. However,
at that stage of the talks the Soviet experts concluded that the Soviet Union would
not get any economic gains from participation in the IMF, which would have only
political importance for securing Soviet influence in international affairs (AVPRF
171, 10).
The Soviet leadership was eager to play a major role in the post-war economic
and political order. This made Moscow agree to some clearly disadvantageous
concessions to remain on board of economic negotiations. It is my belief that Stalin
was not fully aware of all the complexity of the big economic and political game
between the United States and Great Britain, which gained momentum in 1943.
While the latter was struggling to save the remnants of its empire and was
bargaining madly for credits vitally important for its survival, the former were
clearly demanding the role of a world leader. For example, no Soviet documents
show any hint of the Soviet understanding of the role of Canada in this bargaining,
though in 1944 negotiations with Canada on economic issues were clearly more
important to the United States than those with the U.S.S.R. Thus, in American
documents the concern over the terms of the British-Canadian bacon contract
outranks the Soviet-American discrepancy in the basic principles of the IMF
activity (FRUS, 1944, pp. 50, 60, 78, 89).
In July 1944, Soviet representatives attended the United Nations Monetary and
Financial Conference in Bretton Woods, where the Soviet delegation made some
further concessions to the American proposals by agreement with the Kremlin. On
July 22, 1944, the chair of the delegation Mikhail Stepanov signed the Final Act
along with the delegates from other 43 Allied Nations. Immediately after the
Conference, the Soviet delegation submitted detailed observations on the
advantages and disadvantages of the Soviet Union's membership in these
organizations to the NKID, NKVT, Narkomfin, and the State Bank (Gosbank).
Apparently, this question was consistently mooted in the NKID, NKVT,
Narkomfin, and Gosbank throughout the entirety of 1945 (AVPRF 197, 1–4, 10–
18; AVPRF 194, 196–205).
Documents deposited in the Foreign Policy Archive of the Russian Federation
suggest that the U.S.S.R. was about to join both the IMF and International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) until December 31, 1945. In particular,
the collection includes a draft Resolution of the Politburo “On accession of the
U.S.S.R. to the International Monetary Fund and the International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development,” and the findings of a special commission
authorized by a decree of the Council of People’s Commissars from March 5, 1945,
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to develop proposals regarding the possible participation of the U.S.S.R. in the
International Monetary Fund and the IBRD. This commission concluded its work
on November 27, 1945, with recommendations to the Soviet leadership to join the
IMF before December 31 as the entry conditions after that date were to be
determined by the Fund (AVPRF 194, 200).
However, during 1945 the position of the Soviet government to joining the IMF
changed dramatically. Rapidly worsening relations with the United States made
Stalin feel at a loss. The necessity to completely review his foreign policy led him
to make some poor decisions. The decision to postpone the Soviet Union accession
to the IMF might well be one of these poor decisions. Urged by both the Soviet and
American officials to make a statement on the Soviet policy regarding joining the
IMF, on December 29, 1945, the People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs
Vyatcheslav Molotov communicated to Harriman that “the Soviet government
considered it impossible at that time to sign the draft agreement drawn up in Bretton
Woods ... the Soviet Government found it necessary to subject the issues raised by
these projects to further study in the light of the new conditions of postwar economic
developments” (AVPRF 704, 8).
This was obviously a difficult decision. A week earlier, on December 21, 1945
(the day when the “Proposals for the expansion of world trade and employment”
were communicated to Vyshinsky), Molotov got another report on the IMF from
his staff. This report presented weighty considerations from the Soviet Union to
take part in the work of the IMF and the World Bank. In particular, it was believed
that “the entry of the U.S.S.R. into the membership of the International Monetary
Fund would be considered by the United States and other United Nations as a proof
of its desire to participate in international economic cooperation. On the contrary,
the Soviet Union's refusal to participate in the international monetary organizations
would play into the hands of reactionary elements in US and British financial circles
opposing the post-war cooperation between the main countries in the maintenance
of postwar peace and order” (AVPRF 194, 8). Two days before Molotov’s refusal
to sign, the United States ratified the IMF agreement thus making it come into force.
No doubt following the example of Great Britain, the Soviet Union hoped to
barter its signature on the IMF agreement in exchange for guarantees of a large
credit from the United States (Pollard, 1985, pp. 67–68). Since by the end of
December 1945 the issue of the loan still remained unresolved (Van Dormael, 1978,
p. 192), the Soviet Union turned out to be a prisoner of its own aspirations–signing
the agreement without getting the loan could be considered both in the United States
and Great Britain as a clear evidence of the political and economic weakness of the
Soviet Union (Gaddis, 1972, p. 23). It would be fair to say that this viewpoint has
never been proved, but the bulk of documents and literature studied on the subjects
makes very high the probability that the Soviet Leadership was motivated by these
considerations.
The Western countries and the United States, in particular, met the refusal of
the Soviet leadership to join IMF in 1945 with mixed reaction. Opponents saw it as
another proof of the dictatorial aspirations of the Soviet leadership, who did not
want to make any compromises with its former allies. Proponents of more liberal
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positions reminded policymakers that the Soviet Union was not the only country
that had not signed the IMF agreement on December 31, 1945. The list of these
countries included, for example, Australia and New Zealand.
In effect, Molotov’s statement was not an empty excuse and really did not mean
the final rejection by the U.S.S.R. to joining the IMF and the World Bank.
Otherwise, it is doubtful that Moscow would have allowed Czechoslovakia and
especially Poland to become IMF members (Lavigne, 1990, p. 25). In addition, in
March 1946, the Soviet Union took part in the first meeting of the IMF Board of
Governors Fund as an observer (Brabant, 1991). Due to the anticipated entry of the
Soviet Union in 1946 it was decided at this meeting to extend the period for
acceptance of new members on the initial terms until the end of that year (Hexner,
1946, p. 640).
However, 1946 brought drastic changes to the character of the U.S.–Soviet
Union talks on the issues of economic cooperation. As mentioned before, the Soviet
membership in the IMF was no longer a separate question; it had become part of
the whole complex of economic problems of multilateral and bilateral nature, which
Washington agreed to consider only in tandem. The directives for the Soviet
delegation prepared in May 1946 for the talks on the ITO still contained a few
phrases concerning the Bretton Woods institutions. In particular, the document
stated: “If the US government agrees with our proposals and will sign an agreement
on granting a loan, the full and final settlement of the Lend-Lease, the delegation
may declare the readiness of the Soviet Union to join the International Monetary
Fund and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development as well as the
United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization” (RGASPI 28, 70).
The documents discussed in this study present us with a completely new picture
of Soviet-American relations in 1944–1946. The Soviet leadership appears more
open to international cooperation, at least in the economic sphere, than traditionally
believed. Accordingly, the perception of 1946 as the first year of the Cold War takes
a completely different hue. As we can see, in 1946 the Soviet leadership was still
willing to participate in international affairs and did not seek isolation. However,
its decision to take some time out to watch how the events would develop and
consider from outside all the benefits and dangers of an active participation in
international affairs proved to be a fatal mistake. The push-back and foot-dragging
of late 1945–early 1946 turned fatal for Moscow, as the Soviet Union was cut off
from the work of major international institutions, causing significant damage to its
own national interests.
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